Guest Shipping Service Past Times Ruth Groff On Causal Powers

Ruth Groff is Assistant Professor of Political Science at St. Louis University. She specializes inwards the philosophical underpinning...

Ruth Groff is Assistant Professor of Political Science at St. Louis University. She specializes inwards the philosophical underpinnings of Western social together with political thought. She is writer of post on her views of the condition of causal powers inwards Ontology Revisited together with to my post treating causality together with metaphysics. Thanks for contributing, Ruth.

Do You Have to Be an Aristotelian to Believe inwards Powers?

By Ruth Groff

Dan Little asked me lately if I retrieve that 1 has to live on an Aristotelian inwards lodge to believe inwards powers. The enquiry could live on posed the other way around, too: Does believing inwards causal powers automatically build 1 live on an Aristotelian? I retrieve that the respond is in all probability “No,” but I also retrieve that it powerfulness non live on quite equally clear-cut equally it powerfulness seem. I’d similar to exercise this invitee weblog ship service to get down the longer version of the response.

Before I do, though, allow me say, peculiarly for those readers who may live on versed inwards contemporary analytic metaphysics, that the enquiry that I took Dan to live on bespeak is nearly real, alive powers. Do you lot receive got to live on an Aristotelian to believe that the globe is total of activity, of dynamism – that it contains things (“things” broadly construed) that tin flaming engage inwards all trend of doing? By “power” I don’t hateful “the fact of constant conjunction, addition a feeling of expectation,” equally Hume explicitly said that he did.[i] Nor practise I hateful “counterfactual dependency.” Or “a lean belongings equivalent to a neo-Humean disposition, except that it has a fixed identity (such that it is necessarily related to other such properties),” equally my friend Alexander Bird means.[ii]  

One tin flaming attach the term “power” to anything, really, together with and hence claim a belief inwards the existence of powers (as 1 has defined them) inwards virtue of one’s belief inwards the stipulated referent, or truth-maker. But the number is non whether passivists are prepared to re-brand. The number is what the globe is like.

Arbitrarily, even, if demand be, nosotros tin flaming stipulate for the purposes of news that the term “power” denotes what it does for a competent English linguistic communication speaker. Nothing hangs upon the Definition beingness correct, though it may good be; nosotros exactly demand 1 that’s fixed, relative to which nosotros tin flaming locate different positions. H5N1 power, then, let’s say, is an powerfulness to do. Passivists, Humean or otherwise, fighting that at that spot are no such things equally powers construed inwards this normal, every-day way. (Hume genuinely says that the concept is meaningless.) It follows that the enquiry that Dan Little posed cannot live on whether or non a non-Aristotelian passivist is entitled to believe inwards powers conceived equally an powerfulness to do. (Though, for the record: no. One cannot both deny together with affirm the existence of existent causal powers. Also, counterfactual dependency is a detail sort of necessary relation. It is non whatever type of “doing.”) Rather, the enquiry – together with it’s an interesting 1 – is whether or non 1 is necessarily an Aristotelian if 1 is an anti-passivist.

Since Aristotle himself believed inwards powers, 1 way to retrieve nearly the enquiry powerfulness live on to inquire how much overlap 1 should receive got alongside Aristotle period, earlier 1 is either permitted or obliged to label oneself an Aristotelian. In my ain case, I would desire to concur alongside Aristotle on the next 5 points, at an absolute minimum, earlier counting myself an Aristotelian: (1) materialism; (2) potentiality; (3) the thought that things receive got essential properties; (4) emergence; together with (5) the existence of powers. I retrieve that if I were committed only to whatever 1 of these points, it would live on inaccurate to depict me equally an Aristotelian. Others powerfulness receive got a longer or to a greater extent than fine-grained list. That’s fine. I’m happy to consider these 5 points necessary but non sufficient for counting equally an Aristotelian.

Next nosotros volition demand to know if these commitments come upwards equally a bundle deal. If it’s all or nothing, together with hence it does seem equally though believing inwards powers is going to teach 1 at to the lowest degree a proficient fleck of the way towards beingness an Aristotelian. And hither likewise allow me live on equally clear equally possible nearly how I am agreement the commutation ideas, since philosophers practise oft attach damage that they desire to retain to unlikely referents, or truth-makers. (John Stuart Mill, for example, says that if past times “matter” what nosotros hateful is “the permanent possibility of sensation” – equally nosotros should, he thinks – together with hence yes, past times all means, he believes inwards the existence of matter.[iii]  

But that’s non probable to live on what his interlocutor would receive got meant.) What I hateful past times (1) materialism is the stance that that which exists is non exhausted past times (or reducible to), the abstract, the conceptual or the perceptual. By belief inwards (2) potentiality, I hateful a belief inwards existent but unexpressed phenomena (including but non necessarily limited to existent but unexpressed properties). By (3) an essence (or essential belongings or laid of properties), I hateful those ways that a thing is, inwards virtue of which it is the detail that it is and/or the variety of thing that it is, together with non something else and/or of a different kind. By (4) emergence I hateful the stance that wholes exist, together with that, dissimilar pluralities, they are to a greater extent than than the amount of their parts. (5) powers, finally, I receive got already defined inwards damage of capacities for doing.

So the enquiry is whether or non (5) brings (1)-(4) along alongside it necessarily. One powerfulness retrieve that the respond is an obvious no, rather than to a greater extent than careful one. Locke sure enough seems to receive got powers inwards his ontology, together with Locke isn’t an Aristotelian. Leibniz too. But only pointing to people who assert (5), acre denying (1) – (4) won’t live on plenty to create upwards one's heed the issue, since the mere fact that somebody could or does handle that combination of beliefs doesn’t homecoming the combination coherent. It volition live on amend to assume (5), together with and hence seem to run across what the province of affairs is alongside each of (1) – (4).

(1) Materialism

It’s tricky, but I retrieve that 1 tin flaming indeed believe inwards the existence of powers but non live on a materialist. What 1 can’t practise (for the record) is deny materialism together with believe: (a) that powers exist; (b) that causation is the aspect or display thereof; (c) that what nosotros unremarkably retrieve of equally cloth objects acquit equally nosotros unremarkably retrieve they practise – i.e., differently, equally a kind, than non-material objects behave. If 1 believes (a) – (c), together with hence the variety of objects that tin flaming bruise one’s shin (sticks together with stones, for instance), can’t live on impressions or possible sensations or abstract particulars or whatever other entity the beingness of which is alone conceptual or internal to the experience of the subject. The argue for this is that the bar for beingness the drive of something physical goes upwards if causes receive got to genuinely practise something, rather than exactly live on what does or must regularly come upwards first.

(2) Potentiality

I suppose that it is possible to distinguish the thought of action from the thought of potentiality. One could imagine the globe to live on an environs inwards which all powers are “on” at all times, together with only appear to live on latent, inwards virtue of beingness cancelled out past times other powers. Stephen Mumford together with Rani Anjum sometimes utter this way.[iv] Still, it seems to me that both dynamism together with the possibility of beingness unexpressed are essential to the concept of a power. H5N1 globe inwards which all powers are “on” at all times, I desire to say, is non exactly a globe of powers, but a globe of universally actualized powers. The fact that powers are the variety of thing (“thing”) that powerfulness non live on expressed is what led Roy Bhaskar to depict them equally tendencies. (With Mumford together with Anjum, past times contrast, it seems equally though powers are tendencies only inwards that expected effects powerfulness live on cancelled out past times other actualized powers.) If this is right, together with hence a belief inwards powers volition indeed commit 1 to a belief inwards potentiality. But note: it won’t commit 1 to the thought (a) that it is proficient for things to limited or actualize their powers, or (b) that doing hence excellently is things’ ultimate purpose, or (c) that things inwards whatever sense “want” to practise this.

(3) Essential properties

If 1 believes inwards powers, together with hence 1 volition retrieve that what things tin flaming practise is a component subdivision of what powers they (and other things) have, non a component subdivision of laws of nature that dictate their behavior. (Nor volition it practise to only force the nomological floor dorsum a frame: which powers a thing has volition non live on a fact that is itself dictated past times laws.) But I don’t know that 1 would receive got to retrieve that the properties of things are essential to them exactly because 1 believes that at to the lowest degree some of the properties had past times things are powers to do. It seems to a greater extent than probable that it is the regularity of behaviour (conceived equally powers-based activity) and/or the sheer inescapability of differentiation, that leads to the thought that at that spot are ways that something tin flaming together with cannot live on together with nevertheless live on a thing of a given kind.

(4) I don’t run across that a belief inwards powers entails a belief inwards emergence, though 1 who believes inwards both is probable to debate that emergent entities receive got powers non had past times their parts or past times pluralities of their parts.

So what should nosotros conclude? Does 1 receive got to live on an Aristotelian to believe inwards the existence of existent causal powers? As I’ve said, my stance is that the respond is a qualified “No.” Even if nosotros teach inwards real slow to count equally an Aristotelian, it looks equally though 1 doesn’t receive got to live on one, inwards virtue of accepting (5). And the to a greater extent than restrictive the criteria, or course, the less qualified the respond volition be. This said, I suspect that the closer 1 is to beingness an Aristotelian inwards the release sense that I’ve defined here, the to a greater extent than coherent one’s pose volition be, if 1 does believe inwards powers.

I would imagine that for sociologists a ready work concern nearly Aristotelianism powerfulness live on the worry that a belief inwards essential properties entails errors of naturalization together with universalization vis-à-vis particular, historically contingent sociological phenomena. While understandable, I retrieve that the worry is a needless one. Aristotle himself, for example, thinks that the polis (as a representative sociological entity) is an essentially different variety of thing than the family, say. But this does non hateful that all poleis are exactly the same. Not fifty-fifty all proper, non-perverted poleis demand live on the same, variety membership notwithstanding. Admittedly, Aristotle thinks that the polis is a natural phenomenon, inwards the sense that he thinks that, past times nature, human beings demand to live on involved inwards such forms of association inwards lodge to flourish. The polis is both the aspect of our essential powers, together with the venue inwards which such powers tin flaming live on fully actualized. This is non a type of naturalizing that does away alongside the social, but still, 1 powerfulness object. As Charlotte Witt has suggested, a proficient way to conceptualize sociological formations inwards Aristotelian damage is to retrieve of them equally beingness similar to artifacts.[v] Artifacts (i.e., entities made past times human beings) practise non lack essential properties inwards virtue of which they are what they are together with non something else, exactly because they are made past times us. And yet – shared essential properties notwithstanding – knives, to exercise Aristotle’s example, practise non all seem the same. Nor practise all tools rest some forever. I haven’t smelled mimeograph ink since I was a kid. It is truthful that it’s non until Marx that nosotros teach a fully historicized, fully materialist Aristotelian apparatus. But – or perchance I should state “and” – the reality of reified, alienated distinctively human powers is at the absolute meat of Marx’s social science. 

Go ahead together with believe inwards the existence of existent causal powers. You don’t receive got to live on an Aristotelian. And fifty-fifty if it turns out that you lot practise a piffling bit, it’ll live on okay.

Notes

[i] David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding together with Concerning the Principles of Morals; Reprinted from the 1777 edition, alongside Inroduction together with Analytical Index past times L. A. Selby-Bigge; 3^rd edition, alongside text revised together with notes past times P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarenden Press, 1975), esp. Sections IV together with VII of the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.

[ii] For fuller discussion, run across my “Whose Powers? Which Agency?” inwards (eds., Ruth Groff together with John Greco) Powers together with Capacities inwards Philosophy: The New Aristotelianism (New York: Routledge, 2012).

[iii] John Stuart Mill, An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy (London: Longmans, Green, Reader together with Dyer, 1872), Chapter XI together with “Appendix to the Two Preceding Chapters.”

[iv] See, e.g., Stephen Mumford together with Rani Lill Anjum, Getting Causes from Powers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

[v] Personal conversation, Apr 2013.  In add-on to her travel on Aristotle, readers powerfulness live on interested inwards Witt’s recent The Metaphysics of Gender (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2011.