Meso Causes In Addition To Microfoundations

In before posts I've paid attending to the require for microfoundations in addition to the legitimacy of meso-level causation. And I not...

In before posts I've paid attending to the require for microfoundations in addition to the legitimacy of meso-level causation. And I noted that in that place seems to travel a prima facie tension betwixt the 2 views inwards the philosophy of social science. I believe the 2 are compatible if nosotros empathize the microfoundations thesis equally a claim nearly social ontology in addition to non nearly explanation, in addition to if nosotros translate it inwards a weak rather than a potent way. Others convey also found this tension to travel of interest. The September number of The Philosophy of the Social Sciences" provides a real interesting ready of articles on this ready of issues.

Particularly interesting is a contribution past times Tuukka Kaidesoja, "Overcoming the Biases of Microfoundations: Social Mechanisms in addition to Collective Agents" (link). Here are the iv claims advanced inwards the article:

1. The machinery approach to social explanation does non presuppose a commitment to the individual-level microfoundationalism.
2. The microfoundationalist requirement that explanatory social mechanisms should e'er consists of interacting individuals has given ascent to problematic methodological biases inwards social research.
3. It is possible to specify a number of plausible candidates for social macro-mechanisms where interacting collective agents (e.g. formal organizations) bird the heart actors.
4. The distributed knowledge perspective combined amongst arrangement studies could supply us amongst explanatory agreement of the emergent cognitive capacities of collective agents. (abstract)

I concord amongst many of Kaidesoja's criticisms of what he calls individual-level microfoundationalism (IMF). I also concord amongst his preference for the weak "rationalist" excogitation of emergence (along the lines of Mario Bunge) rather than the potent excogitation associated amongst Niklas Luhman (link). However, I desire to proceed to keep that in that place is a unlike version of microfoundationalism that is non vulnerable to the criticisms he offers -- what I telephone telephone the "weak" version of microfoundations. (This is explicated inwards several before posts; link.) On this approach, claims nearly higher-level entities require to travel plausibly compatible amongst in that place existence microfoundations at the private bird (an ontological principle), but I deny that nosotros e'er require to supply those microfoundations when offering a social explanation (an explanatory principle). And inwards fact, Kaidesoja seems to adopt a real similar position:

By contrast, inwards many explanatory studies on large-scale macro-phenomena, it is sufficient that nosotros convey a full general agreement how the collective agents of this form component division (e.g., how collective-decisions are typically made inwards the organizations that are the components of the relevant macro-mechanism) in addition to empirically grounded reasons to believe that the macro-phenomenon of involvement was causally generated past times the interactions of this form of collective agents amongst emergent powers.... Of course, it is e'er possible to zoom inwards to a item collective agent in addition to report the underlying mechanisms of its emergent causal powers, but this type of enquiry requires the uses of unlike methods in addition to information from the explanatory studies on large-scale macro- phenomena. (316)

So it is the in-principle availability of lower-level analyses that is important, non the actual provision of those accounts. Or inwards other words, K is offering a ready of arguments designed to flora the explanatory sufficiency of at to the lowest degree simply about meso- in addition to macro-level causal accounts (horizontal) rather than requiring that explanations should travel vertical (rising from lower levels to higher levels). This is what I desire to advert to equally "relative explanatory autonomy of the meso-level."

Kaidesoja's set is a realist one; he couches his analysis of causation inwards damage of the thought of causal powers. Here is Kaidesoja's description of the thought of causal powers:

In full general terms, causal powers of complex entities include their dispositions, abilities, tendencies, liabilities, capacities, in addition to capabilities to generate specific type of effects inwards suitable conditions. Each item entity (or powerful particular) possesses its powers past times virtue of its nature, which inwards plough tin typically travel explicated inwards damage of the intrinsic relational construction of the entity. (302)

This set provides an respond to 1 of the questions late posed here: are causal powers in addition to causal mechanisms compatible? I intend they are, in addition to Kaidesoja appears to equally well.

One of import nuance concerns the kinds of higher-level social structures that Kaidesoja offers equally examples. They all involve collective actors, therefore assimilating social causal might to intentional action. But the category of macro social factor that have causal powers is broader than this. There are credible examples of social powers that exercise non depend on whatsoever form of intentionality. Most of the examples offered past times Charles Perrow, for example, of organizations amongst causal powers depend on features of functioning of the organization, non its functioning equally a quasi-intentional agent.

Also interesting inwards the article is Kaidesoja's gloss on the thought of distributed cognition. I'm non receptive to the thought of collective social actors is a strongly intentionalist feel (link), but K makes utilisation of the thought of distributed knowledge inwards a feel that seems unobjectionable to people who intend that social entities ultimately depend on private actors. K's interpretation doesn't imply commitment to collective thoughts or intentions. Here is a clear declaration of the idea:

An of import implication of the higher upwards perspectives is that they enable 1 to ascribe emergent cognitive capacities to social groups in addition to to report the underlying mechanisms of these capacities empirically (e.g., Hutchins 1995; Theiner in addition to O’Connor 2010). This however requires that nosotros reconsider our received concept of knowledge that ties all cognitive capacities to private organisms (e.g., human beings), since groups plainly lack system-level consciousness or brains equally distinct from those of their private members.  (317)

Now, drawing on arrangement studies (e.g., Scott in addition to Davis 2003), I advise that formal organizations (in short, organizations) tin travel understood equally social groups that are designed to laissez passer simply about (more or less clearly specified) finish or goals, in addition to whose activities are planned, administrated, in addition to managed past times their members (or simply about subgroup of their members such equally managers). Examples of organizations include schools, concern firms, universities, hospitals, political parties, in addition to governments. (318)

This is a excogitation of "cognition" that doesn't imply anything similar "collective minds" or grouping intentions, in addition to seems unobjectionable from an ontological indicate of view.

This is a real squeamish slice of piece of job inwards the philosophy of social science, in addition to it suggests that it volition travel worthwhile to pass fourth dimension reading Kaidesoja's recent book, Naturalizing Critical Realist Social Ontology (Ontological Explorations), equally well.